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Abstract Modern integrative systems biology defines itself by the complexity of
the problems it takes on through computational modeling and simulation. However
in integrative systems biology computers do not solve problems alone. Problem
solving depends as ever on human cognitive resources. Current philosophical
accounts hint at their importance, but it remains to be understood what roles human
cognition plays in computational modeling. In this paper we focus on practices
through which modelers in systems biology use computational simulation and other
tools to handle the cognitive complexity of their modeling problems so as to be able
to make significant contributions to understanding, intervening in, and controlling
complex biological systems. We thus show how cognition, especially processes of
simulative mental modeling, is implicated centrally in processes of model-building.
At the same time we suggest how the representational choices of what to model in
systems biology are limited or constrained as a result. Such constraints help us both
understand and rationalize the restricted form that problem solving takes in the field
and why its results do not always measure up to expectations.
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1 Introduction
Modern computational science is complex: cognitively, technologically, and
collaboratively. A prime example is the field of integrative systems biology
(ISB). This field aims to understand, intervene on, and control biological systems
comprising integrated, interacting, complex networks of genes, proteins, and
biochemical reactions. In the field of ISB those who do computational modeling (as
opposed to data mining) tend to use ‘‘computational model(ing)’’ and ‘‘simulation’’
interchangeably because the purpose of building a computational model in ISB is to
run simulations of actual and counterfactual system dynamics. Model simulation is
the process through which models both are built and are tested. Solutions to the
problems the field poses create an essential interdependence among the participating
fields: computational sciences, engineering sciences, and biological sciences. The
nature of the problems posed in integrative systems biology requires both
specialization and collaboration. Although there are some on-going attempts to
develop hybrid modeler-experimentalists, in principle, modelers (mainly engineers,
physicists, and applied mathematicians) and experimentalists (mainly molecular
biologists and biochemists) have a symbiotic relationship. One bioscientist we
interviewed characterized the situation succinctly:
Number one, team science is the only way it’s gonna work these days. It’s
really gonna get hard to write a single investigator RO1 these days and expect
to get funded because everyone is now realizing the interconnectedness of
everything. And for me to be able to sit here and think that I can have all the
expertise in my tiny little brain to do everything with all these approaches that
I don’t understand at all is ridiculous…that’s not how it’s (bimodal) ever
really gonna work… at the PI level because you’re gonna be much more on
one side than the other. So you need the other half of your [bioscientist] brain
to be in another person, G4 [a modeler]. For me, to be [in] G4.1
However, with little knowledge of one another’s methods, concepts, technolo-
gies, and epistemic values, at the present time symbiosis is more a desideratum than
a reality. Although the field is young, developing, and diverse, the challenges of
collaboration that were detailed in our interviews of both modelers and
experimentalists are widespread, which we see when presenting our claims to
wider audiences of systems biologists. In the absence of effective collaborations, the
lack of biological knowledge and access to sufficient data for building models
increases the inherent cognitive complexity of the task for modelers. Further, unlike
the situations of physics-based and climate science modeling that predominates in
the philosophical literature on computational modeling and simulation (see for
instance Winsberg 2010; Parker 2010; Lenhard 2006, 2007; Humphreys 2004)
systems biology lacks well established domain theories which can provide a
platform of representational resources and methods for developing reliable
simulation models (see MacLeod and Nersessian 2013a). The modelers we have
1 Italicized quotations are drawn from our interviews of researchers who participated in our study.
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studied bring with them tools and tricks from engineering, but all aspects of the
process of modeling complex biological systems are open to decision, including:
• Representations of biochemical interactions to use (Michaelis–Menten, power
laws, etc.)
• Data sets and databases to use.
• Pathway elements to include or exclude.
• Parameter estimation techniques, parameter-fixing algorithms, algorithm
development.
We have conducted a 5-year ethnographic investigation of modeling practices in
two pioneering integrative systems biology laboratories in which the biosystems
modelers mostly had engineering backgrounds.2 Lab G conducts only computa-
tional modeling. Lab C conducts computational modeling and modelers also
conduct their own bench-top experiments in service of model-building. Lab C
researchers have the ability to incorporate experiment into their practices which
leads to hybrid experiment-modeling strategies (see MacLeod and Nersessian
2013b). We label these researchers ‘‘bi-modal’’. In this paper however we restrict
ourselves to the practices mostly used in Lab G. Although there is a range of ways in
which systems biology is practiced, dedicated computational labs which collaborate
with external experimentalists predominate. Our primary goals in this paper are (1)
to help understand how these ‘‘uni-modal’’ computational modelers are able to
handle the complexity of their modeling problems cognitively so as to build at least
partially accurate models, and in turn make sometimes profound contributions to the
understanding of the systems they are modeling; and (2) to understand, to the extent
possible given our data, the ways in which cognitive capacities and constraints play
a role in the representations they build and methodological choices they make.
These choices might initially appear ineffective given the epistemological goals of
the field, but can be rationalized nonetheless on cognitive grounds.
In this respect our paper both builds upon and diverges from the traditional
manner through which cognitive practices in science have been studied in
philosophy of science and elsewhere.3 Various philosophers for instance have
studied the cognitive affordances of particular model-building and other strategies
for building representations of phenomena. Wimsatt for instance has leveraged
Levin’s original discussion of modeling strategies for simplifying and idealizing
2 The ethnographic and interviewing parts of our investigation took place between 2010 and 2014. We
then followed up with the graduate student researchers through the awarding of their Ph.D.’s. The last
student in lab G finished in 2016. ODE and calculus-based biosystems modeling approaches continue to
be a fruitful, especially in the contemporary context of the greater availability of time series data and
enhanced computing resources. For a review of recent research using the BST approach of our modelers
see (Voit 2013a, b). A range of contemporary practitioners of mesoscopic modeling were contributors to a
recent international conference on the state of the field https://www.cecam.org/workshop-1-1269.html.
3 A field of ‘‘cognitive science (studies) of science’’ has been developing since the early 1980 s with
philosophers of science, psychologists, and AI researchers participating. Pioneering work in philosophy
of science include Darden (1991), Giere (1988), Nersessian (1984, 1992), and Thagard (1988). However
since only the more recent work of Nersessian and colleagues that we cite here addresses the practices of
computational modeling and simulation, we draw mainly from that.
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complex biological systems (in population biology), and Simon’s work on problem-
solving, into a cognitive theory of the affordances and biases of common
reductionistic heuristics in scientific practice (see Wimsatt 2007; see also Bechtel
and Richardson’s discussion of the role of decomposition and localization heuristics
in handling complex systems). Wimsatt’s work has precipitated a line of discussion
on the role that false models, idealized models and robustness analysis play in
scientific discovery processes (e.g. Weisberg 2006). This research helps both
understand and rationalize the steps modelers typically employ to break down
complex systems and recover information about these systems from their models
given cognitive and other constraints.
When trying to account for the methodological choices and abilities of systems
biologists to derive information from complex biochemical systems we want to
illustrate in this paper an important role for a cognitive analysis that goes deeper
than the analysis of heuristics, to consider actual cognitive mechanisms and
processes modelers rely upon to process information through the use of their
models. Part of the need for this as we will see is that many of the inferences and
decisions modelers make about how to structure and improve their models are
dependent on the ways in which computational simulations are used to help
augment and direct their own cognitive capacities. As the title of Humphreys (2004)
book advertises, computational simulation provides a novel way of ‘‘extending
ourselves;’’ that is, it provides fundamentally new ways of doing science through
extending human cognitive capacities. But, this and other analyses mostly hint at the
nature of these capacities without providing a precise account of the cognitive
functions and factors which underlie them.
To develop this account, we need to draw from research in the cognitive sciences,
particularly in the area of mental modeling, mental simulation, model-based
reasoning and distributed cognition. On our account, just as the microscope and
telescope extended the human capacity for ‘‘seeing,’’ computational simulation has
extended the human cognitive capacity for reasoning via mentally simulating
dynamical phenomena (‘‘simulative model-based reasoning’’4). The account we
have been developing moves away from cognitive models that focus exclusively on
individual cognitive processes and draws from the cognitive frameworks of
distributed cognition and of simulative mental modeling to cast the modeler and
model as constituting a ‘‘coupled cognitive system’’ through which model-based
inferences are made (Nersessian 2002, 2008; Chandrasekharan et al. 2012;
Chandrasekharan and Nersessian 2015; Chandrasekharan and Nersessian, forth-
coming). Accounts of distributed cognition in science have been proposed by others
in the philosophical literature (see, e.g., Giere 2002), but these accounts focus on the
collective or socially distributed nature of cognition, rather than the distribution
among instruments, artifacts and technologies, and a human agent. Despite the
interdisciplinary nature of systems biology, the process of model-building is mostly
the responsibility of the individual modeler rather than well-coordinated collective
4 See Nersessian (2008) for a detailed critical analysis of the ‘‘mental modeling framework,’’ and the role
of ‘‘simulative model-based reasoning’’ in science and engineering (Nersessian 2009).
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processes between modelers and experimentalists. This is largely because the
computational model is a ‘‘black box’’ to most experimentalists.
As such in this paper we aim to illustrate the value of richer cognitive accounts
for explaining problem-solving processes and methodological choices in a
computational field such as ISB. To this end in Sect. 2 we begin by considering
the complex nature of the problem solving tasks which confront modelers in
systems biology, and the kinds of inferences they are able to make in order to
improve their models despite this complexity. In Sect. 3 we discuss the potential
importance of distributed cognition and of mental modeling as the cognitive
mechanisms through which modelers produce these inferences. In Sect. 4 we show
the potential for such a cognitive account to help explain and rationalize various
aspects of methodological choice in the field. The size and scale of networks being
modeled by systems biologists seem too small for obtaining central goals in the
field, particularly with respect to prediction (Voit et al. 2012a, b). We will suggest
that the size and scale of network which can be represented is constrained by limits
on the operational effectiveness of those cognitive practices modelers rely on, but
the modeling practices can be rationalized nonetheless on cognitive grounds, as
meaningful steps in the direction of predictive models. Such insights help
demonstrate the useful role that cognitive approaches can play for philosophy of
science in our attempt to unpack, and discover the rational basis, for scientific
practice.
2 Cognitive dimensions of model-building in integrative systems biology
We begin this section with a brief description of the field and the nature of the
problem-solving tasks that confront our modelers, before detailing some of the
specific kinds of inferences modelers need to make during the model-building
process and the cognitive processes they use to make those inferences.
Two overarching aims of modern systems biology are (1) to build detailed large
scale representations of biological systems (Kitano 2002) and (2) to discover any
design or organization principles that characterize the components of systems (Alon
2006, 2007). In our labs the first goal is the predominant goal of individual
researchers. Our labs specialize in building ordinary differential equation models
(ODE models) of gene regulatory, cellular metabolic and cell signaling networks.
Variables in the model describe concentrations of each metabolite in the network in
an individual cell (‘‘pathway’’). These models are run to simulate the changes to the
concentrations of metabolites in a cellular network over time, where each metabolite
pool interacts with certain other metabolites, represented as its neighbors in a
network. In general our modelers aim to produce models that make good predictions
of the dynamic relationships between certain variables in the model, and are thus
robust in performance with respect to parameter and initial condition variations. We
label such models ‘‘predictively valid’’.
One of the central assertions of modern systems biology is that in vitro
approaches of traditional experimental molecular biology are insufficient for
understanding and controlling the causal properties and behavior of biochemical
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networks. While experiment may reveal local causal interactions between molecular
elements, biochemical functions tend to be controlled and orchestrated through
large scale networks (networks with wide boundaries) of large size (involving many
interacting elements). These networks tend to function through nonlinear interac-
tions, such as feedback loops. As a result the causal properties an element of a
network has are dependent on interactions happening upstream and downstream in
the network. These features explain in part why particular systemic diseases like
cancer or cystic fibrosis have proven so difficult to treat (Hood et al. 2004).
Complex networks such as these generate robustness and redundancy, and nonlinear
sensitivity to certain parameter changes, which make them difficult to control, and
also give rise to variability across individual cells and organisms. As such only
simulated quantitative models of these networks can capture networks at the scale
and size required to identify variabilities and predict network behavior in response
to perturbations accurately enough to know how to intervene on them effectively.
These high fidelity models are needed, for instance, to help us estimate the right
drug combinations and dosage for any individual to control a disease effectively. It
is important to point out, however, that such simulative modeling is only possible
because of the massive amounts of experimental data made available on-line in
curated databases, the development of new experimental methods for large-scale
data collection, and, of course, experimental validation of model predictions.
The field of systems biology is nonetheless heterogeneous in its approach to
using computation, ranging from highly computational approaches using big data
technology (high-throughput systems) and data mining algorithms in order to
reverse-engineer system structure (often called top-down) to the more bottom-up
techniques that work with data accumulated by experimental molecular biologists to
develop mathematical models that can drive computational simulations of networks
(Westerhoff and Kell 2007). The systems biology labs we have focused on are of the
latter kind.
2.1 Complex problem solving tasks
Levins criticizes systems ecology as a brute force approach to modeling running
counter to his view of what the aim of modeling should be, namely to generate
understandable simplified abstract or idealized representations of phenomena
(Levins 1966). Systems biologists do rely on key abstractions, particularly the
mathematical representations they use of biochemical interactions. One goal is to
generate models that are easy to explore mathematically (see Voit 2000). However,
given the sensitivity and complexity of biological systems, modelers in the field
(particularly those who favor a bottom-up approach) are committed to the view that
details matter and abstraction should be minimized or carefully controlled.5
Detailed ‘‘mechanistic’’ representations of networks and accurate parameters are
required for producing predictively valid models. In this way modelers walk a
tightrope between exhaustive and more tractable idealized representations. In the
best case scenario, a modeler would start with a well-described or developed
5 see however Hetherington et al. (2006) for a conflicting view.
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pathway of the particular system he or she is interested in (the pathway diagram or
pathway representation), which documents the sequences of all important
interactions within a network.6 They would decide how to represent mathematically
(the mathematical model or representation) the various interactions among
metabolites and use the data available from experimentalists or high-throughput
technology to derive the parameters for those interactions. With suitably rich data
the number of undetermined parameters should be low, allowing a straight-forward
algorithmic calculation of a best fit.
Unfortunately most modeling situations are quite far from this ideal and the
central challenge for modelers is how to put together reasonably robust models
under much messier conditions. In the first place, there is almost always a serious
deficiency in the data available for model-building. Pathway structures and
parameter sets are often incomplete. Modelers have to derive what data they can
from the literature in order to both fill in the pathway and estimate parameters.
Second, since the data often have to come from different sources derived under
different experimental conditions, errors are almost always introduced which have
to be corrected for. Even then most modelers are left with large numbers of
undetermined parameters. Third, as we have documented elsewhere, collaborative
relationships are fraught with difficulties (MacLeod and Nersessian 2013c, 2014).
For instance, modelers who collaborate are rarely able to get the experimentation
they need performed at critical points in the model-building process. Fourth, ISB
lacks domain theory that can be relied upon to instruct modelers on how to go from
a given data set to a good representation. The quality, quantity, and type of data can
all vary substantially, resulting in a variety of situations that are too broad and too
various to be fit to one canonical approach. Most often researchers have to choose
how to represent interactions and what aspects of pathways to model given the
nature of the data (Chandrasekharan and Nersessian 2015; MacLeod and Nersessian
2013a, c). This is often an intensive process of figuring out precisely what they can
represent reliably with the data available and adapting the problem they are trying to
solve to fit these data constraints.
Finally the complexity of biological networks amplifies the difficulties of finding
good representations. Complexities include the facts that networks contain frequent
feed-forward and feedback effects and that many elements play multiple roles in a
network. Fitting a mathematical form to such highly nonlinear systems is a complex
problem. Adding new structure for instance may be necessary, but this requires
predicting what effects a modification to the pathway representation will have and
where the modification needs to happen to resolve the problem, neither of which
may be obvious. Further given the unpredictability of changes in parameter values
in the model it might be hard to isolate regions of the parameter spaces to search for
finding good fits. This leaves much work to algorithmic processes of parameter
fitting, but these run up against computational constraints, and such processes are
unlikely to find the best fit in such circumstances. The result is that representing
6 See Figs. 1 and 2 in Sect. 2.2.2 later in this paper as examples of such diagrams for a metabolic
network.
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accurately even only specific dynamic relationships in the networks can be a highly
time-consuming and highly iterative process.
2.2 Model-based inferences in model-building
To be able to build models, modelers typically have to rely on the dynamical
behavior of their models to make inferences about how to proceed in building the
model, such as what elements to include in the pathway representation of the
biological system. Modelers need to infer for instance,
Fig. 1 G10’s modified pathway diagram for the alfalfa lignin system. These molecular pathway
diagrams display sequences of chemical transformations within a cell (or across cell-boundaries) which
give rise to a particular biological function (in this case lignin production, represented as H, G and S). The
biochemical elements and their interactions can be translated directly into a mathematical model by
which nodes represent the concentrations of the chemical representations and arrows the rates of reaction.
G10 assembled an original ‘‘wild-type’’ diagram based on known results provided to him by his
collaborators. Various elements were added to the original by him, such as the arrows connecting
p-coumaryl CoA to phenylalanine, and cinnamic acid to the environment, the latter signifying a loss from
the system. Models built based on the original diagram were mathematically incapable of producing
accurate behavior when inputs were perturbed out of equilibrium suggesting to him that some regulatory
mechanisms controlling extra flux had not been factored into the current biological picture. He identified
additional interactions which would resolve the extra-flux, in particular those arrows connecting
p-coumaryl CoA to phenylalanine, and cinnamic acid to the environment
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1. Structural and parametric errors in models;
2. The nature and form of missing network structure (network elements, relations);
3. Dominant dynamical variables in the network.
2.2.1 Inferring errors
In the course of modeling it is typical for modelers to discover, or at least come to
suspect, that the mathematical and pathway representations they have developed
from background models and from information in the literature are not adequate to
get an ODE model which fits the system they are studying under plausible parameter
ranges. One of the central tasks of the modeler in order to move forward is to infer
precisely the points in the mathematical representation where these errors occur and
what type of errors they are. Errors can be related for instance to critical missing
Fig. 2 G10’s drawing of the pathway diagram for the lignin system with unknown molecule X added
with feedback and feed-forward relations regulating the S and G channels respectively. The S-channel
serves to down-regulate S-lignin production and the G-channel up-regulate G lignin. G10’s model thus
acquired a mechanism for producing the lower S/G ratio predicted in the data. X also accounted for the
excess cinnamic acid G10 had originally hypothesized as leaving the system
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elements and interactions in the pathway, the adequacy of mathematical represen-
tations of interactions between elements, or parameter values. This kind of inference
often depends heavily on model-based reasoning: in particular using the model
simulation to infer the location of an error.
For instance G16 was given a task by the lab director G4 to improve upon a
certain mathematical model (a set of coupled ODEs) of glycolysis in the bacterium
lactococcus lactis. Once a better working model was in place she hoped to be able to
‘‘incorporate pH effects in the model, and ultimately genetically modify L. lactis to
synthesize a required drug and withstand stomach acid in order to deliver the drug to
the intestine, thereby circumventing the discomfort and side effects of currently
available intravenous therapies’’ (poster presentation). However even trying to
produce a better model over the one available proved a highly complex task. One of
the central problems with the original model was that it failed to predict correctly,
when fit, the existence of a known peak in the catalyst FBP for different
environmental glucose concentrations. The model for instance gave a peak at initial
values but not at 20 mmol of glucose, or 40 or 80.
The long term goal is making this bacterium survive the acidity of stomach
and somehow preserve the pathway for the lower PHs. But right now we are
trying to model it to improve the model as much as we can. So right now the
question I am answering is like how to change the model in a way that it
captures some specific effect. That effect being when you input more glucose
into the system the peak doesn’t go off it… the peak is always same thing.
(2011-08-09-i-G-G16/168)
She had a certain amount of good but patchy data to work with from a collaborator
G7 (a postdoc in lab G who was an experimentalist transitioning to becoming a
modeler). These data only gave information on some parameters, meaning that
many would have to be fit or estimated in other ways. By observing the effects of
different parameter changes through the model using certain representations (see for
example Fig. 3) and via simulation she was able to draw the conclusion that under
no reasonable modifications of the existing model could it be made to reproduce the
right peak behavior. Further she was able to diagnose precisely where the likely
errors were to be found in the model.
I find glitches in the model, and why is it that, for example, sometimes I was
trying to model something and then it wasn’t getting better. And when you
look at more closely and there’s no way it can get better because it depends on
two things, and those two other things, for example, are increasing. So you can
cFig. 3 G16 working towards ‘‘getting a feel’’ for the model or envisioning relationships using pen and
paper representations of numerical information to interpret the effects of the equations. a The pathway
diagram she worked with in this instance. Around the diagram are various notes to help her interpret
network dynamics using the diagram, including a numerical table tracking the evolving concentrations of
elements at sequential time-steps. b A larger version of such a table including more elements of the
pathway. G16 manually calculated the concentrations of biochemicals in the network in order to visually
represent how fluxes move through the network, which provides her information on qualitative
relationships in the network. Such diagrams could also be used to observe the effects of parameter
modifications
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never get it decreasing for a period of time from those two. Maybe something
else has a role that I haven’t taken into account. (2012-08-31-i-G-G16/65)
In this case G16 managed to isolate two upstream elements in the model which were
both interacting with FBP so as to prevent FBP decreasing under greater glucose
concentrations. Researchers often refer to this kind of analysis and understanding of
a model as having a ‘‘feel for the model’’ (Voit et al. 2012a, b). It consists in
developing an ability to understand what role model components are playing and
how they serve to constrain the dynamical behavior the model can produce (see
Sect. 3). Our modelers rarely have access to data or new, targeted experimentation
which can help pinpoint precisely where their assumptions might be wrong
(MacLeod and Nersessian 2013b). Instead the mathematical model is their only
platform. Modelers try various simulations based on the experimental data they
have (which usually maps the relations between just particular variables) over
different potential parameter sets to try to infer the mathematical limitations in the
model which might be causing an error.
2.2.2 Inferring new network structure
Once errors have been detected and localized, modelers need to hypothesize what
might be missing. To do so requires an understanding of how their model functions
but also, more particularly, the effects of changes to the model. This in turn requires
a skilled knowledge of mathematical relationships. Being new to modeling in
biology G16 was unsure how to modify her model to produce the right behavior,
given her lack of biological knowledge. There could have been a missing element in
her model, but she struggled to identify what is was herself. G7 gave her some
important advice. ‘‘He suggested I try to work like—think about it mathematically.
And when I make it right mathematically try to see why this happens. What is the
explanation behind it.’’ (2011-02-07-i-G-G16/104). Finding an approximate or
appropriate mathematical relationship would help use the model to narrow the
biological possibilities.
G16 decided to experiment with the interactions governing the upstream
molecules and their network neighbors to see if she could dampen their influence in
the right way. She thus toyed first with a more complex Hill-function to represent
catalytic interactions then switched to a step-function because of its tractability.7
For a specific set of such interactions she hypothesized that a Step-function
interaction (something that approximates a Hill type of catalytic interaction) rather
than a logistic function (for instance Michaelis–Menten or power-law) would have
the desired effect of correcting the dynamics in a straightforward way with minimal
parameter requirements. Checking the potential validity of the hypothesis was
nonetheless a complex process. It was not just a matter of running the model, but of
refitting the parameters to see how well a good fit solution worked and inferring
back to the validity of the hypothesis. In this case it produced a reasonable result
which G16 thought was a good candidate for representing a specific interaction in
7 Hill functions models interactions as switch-like, switching rapidly from high to low states as an
independent variable like substrate concentration of a reaction catalyst is increased.
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the right way given their performance, pointing the way to underlying unaccounted
for biological influence on that interaction. Of course not all inferences made this
way will be correct, as G16 noted, ‘‘…these are vague ideas. Maybe none of these
work. Right now I should run it for the assumptions I have, just collect the curves.’’
(2011-02-07-i-G-G16/132). Given the complexity it is surprising that accurate
inferences are able to be drawn through such processes. Nonetheless in our labs
researchers have a solid history of making good inferences that lead to robust results
and experimental validation. Some of these inferences can be quite novel.
Consider the case of G10, who was modeling lignin synthesis in two plant
species (Chandrasekharan and Nersessian 2015 details this case). Lignin, a
structural material in cells, interferes with attempts to get plant metabolism to
produce biofuel chemicals and G10’s goal was to try to understand how to control
lignin production to make biofuel production more efficient. His experimental
collaborators provided him with limited data and he had to assemble the synthesis
pathways for both species (poplar and alfalfa) himself. His original pathways
represented nearly a 20-year consensus of collected biological opinion on lignin
synthesis. However, particularly in the case of alfalfa, it became clear to G10 that
the set of interactions and elements as described in that pathway representation plus
the available data could not produce the right mathematical relationships between
the particular variables he was interested in. The original model was built for the
wild-type system at steady-state, and such a model was not necessarily capable of
handling successful manipulations of the system. Indeed G10 discovered that the
original pathways were mathematically incapable of producing accurate behavior
when inputs were perturbed out of equilibrium suggesting to him that some
regulatory mechanisms controlling extra flux had not been factored into the current
biological picture. Using the pathway diagram to help identify plausible network
additions, and then perturbing the mathematical model through the aid of simulation
to check these additions, G10 was able to hypothesize sets of additional fluxes to the
model which would eliminate the excess flux in the appropriate amounts and then
choose among them according to biological plausibility (see the highlighted arrows
in Fig. 1 below). For instance a surplus in the model of p-coumaryl CoA could be
handled mathematically in a biologically plausible way if some of that flux was
removed to the production of phenylalanine and eliminated from the system through
cinnamic acid leaving the cell. These he translated to more precise mathematical
modifications that would relieve the system. In his words ‘‘this is an important piece
of knowledge that comes from the model,’’ through understanding its dynamics.
Further, using information he had on down-regulation and up-regulation of
particular variables and their effects on G and S lignin production, G10 reasoned
that G and S lignin production were happening in ways outside of what was
mathematically possible within the model, despite his flux additions, namely the
model was giving too high a value for the ratio of S to G. However from an
understanding of the dynamics in his model G10 inferred that the easiest and most
efficient mathematical way to resolve this problem was to hypothesize another
element in the network (see Fig. 2) being produced from the excess cinnamic acid.
This element would be selectively regulating the pathways or ‘‘channels’’
responsible for generating S and G lignin. He called this element ‘X’ because he
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lacked sufficient biological knowledge to hazard a guess as to what it might be. If
cinnamic acid actually produced a substance X which both up-regulated G-channel
flows and down regulated s-channel ones, then a model could be generated which
produced very accurate dynamical, not just steady-state, behavior.
So this is actually the biggest finding from our model. So by adding this
reaction you can see that we hypothesize that there is another compound that
can give a regulation….give a feed forward regulation to other parts of the
pathway. (2011-04-12-i-G10/20)
His postulation of a here-to-fore unknown metabolite in the lignin pathway is a
novel inference derived from a very good understanding by G10 of quantitative
movements within the network model and how to control the numbers effectively.
The inclusion of X led to a robust model on his part that supported his hypothesis,
and is the sort of outcome considered by systems biologists to be an excellent
example of the investigative power of model-building. In this case his hypothesis
was borne out by his experimental collaborators and hailed as a major discovery.
2.2.3 Inferring dominant dynamical variables
Another kind of model-based inference our modelers are required to make is of the
dominant dynamical relationships operating in the systems they are investigating or
at least with respect to functions of the system they wish to account for. Such
inferences allow modelers to simplify their models by removing or treating as
constant particular variables (i.e. metabolite concentrations), or fixing their
governing parameters arbitrarily with easy to handle values. Ultimately the
parameter-fitting problem is reduced as a result. Finding parameter fits can be
impossible otherwise. Parameter landscapes for nonlinear systems with too many
unfit parameters will generate many local minima. Searching through entire
parameter spaces using available methods is too computationally intensive and too
likely to find inadequate minima. Getting a successful parameter optimization is
thus a driving factor in the decisions modelers make about how to represent their
system.
The main techniques of extracting dominant relationships come under the
heading of sensitivity analysis. The term and the many specific methods are
inherited from engineering. Sensitivity analysis has a number of functions apart
from just identifying dominant relationships, such as discovering errors in models.
In terms of identifying these relationships, sensitivity analysis involves processes
and techniques by which modelers scan the models to find out which parameters
have the most effect on the model and which have the least. It is thus again a type of
model-based inference. The ones which have minimal effect can in theory just be
removed from the network representation or given constant values—often just 0’s or
1’s—to simplify even further the mathematics. As in the case of inferring new
structure, inferring dominant relationships in a network requires insight into how the
available mathematical representations work (assuming they are for the most part
accurate). Variables are less dominant the less effect that changes in their governing
parameters have on network dynamics.
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Sensitivity analysis is often performed locally by studying the mathematical
structure of the model(s) and studying effects of changes in individual parameters
and following the effects of those changes through a network using pen and paper.
Researchers often build mathematical arguments based on model structure
(examining for instance partial derivatives) to justify removing a variable from a
network or using trivial values for its parameters or ‘‘off-lining’’ it by treating its
output as constant. For instance according to a lab C modeler, C7,
and then, that’s where the, you know, the trick comes in, the good modeler
would know how much to restrict the system so that he has most of the things
that are known—and very few things that are unknown—and those can be
tested. You find points in the system that are more sensitive to changes… So,
if you change the less-sensitive points, it doesn’t affect the output as much. So,
what you can do is find what’s more sensitive, if that is unknown, try to tweak
things there. (2009-04-i-C7/76)
If the system is too complex for such step-by-step exploration of sensitivities then
modelers will often turn to a more global computational method. G10 for instance
employed a statistical strategy, a type of variance-based analysis, running his
models with a thousand different parameter sets (sampled using Monte Carlo
techniques) and calculating the Pearson correlation coefficient of each parameter
with the S/G variable he was particularly interested in. He used this process to make
a statistical argument about which parameters were most significant with respect to
that variable, trivially setting the rest. Such methods avoid having to make
inferences about sensitivity directly, but they are computationally intensive and
statistical techniques will average out sharp differences in the effects of particular
parameters in different parameter domains. The only way to discover and become
aware of these is with more local investigation of the model.
3 A ‘‘Feeling for the Model’’: simulative mental modeling
and distributed cognition
The exemplars considered provide some insight into the cognitive dimensions of
ISB modeling: how methodological and representational choices in model building
are aimed at reducing a complex problem to one that is cognitively tractable and
how computational model-building and simulation processes support inferences that
lead to novel hypotheses about phenomena under investigation (e.g., biological
pathway elements). In this section we propose a cognitive account of how they are
able to draw these inferences.
All these inferences depend on being able to understand to a degree how the
model operates and estimate what the effect of changes might be. Modelers
necessarily rely on developing the ability to filter good hypotheses out of the large
collection of hypotheses so as to select which time-consuming but risky
modifications to try. Modelers themselves often talk in more general terms about
the ‘‘understanding’’ or ‘‘insight’’ necessary for modeling. Our data support the
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modelers’ claims that such understanding is critical to their success and to their
ability to get more insightful results.
Speaking of the need for insight as opposed to just raw optimization methods
used by some systems biologists, G16 states,
I don’t like optimizing because—by optimization you would think, well just
use one of the optimization methods—genetic algorithm this and that. It’s not
like that because it’s a very huge system, usually. Like a lot of variables if you
just use this and that optimization method, it’s not going to work….the error
surface is like—has a lot of like—local minima…you will just get stuck in one
of them. So you gotta have insight, then there’s a lot of—as [lab director] puts
it, ‘elbow greasing’. (2012-02-15-I-G-G16/86)
Optimization is, as she calls it, a ‘‘blind process’’.
Cause it’s easy to fit everything in and say, this is how it works. But then if
you really want to get the results afterwards, like have the model—let the
model have the predictive power you want it to have, you gotta be sure about
what you are doing. (2012-02-15-I-G-G16/260)
In general, processes of developing this kind of understanding—of being ‘‘sure’’—
are slow.
So when you get here, you’re like very frustrated. Like, nothing is known to
any extent [with emphasis]. And then you think like—I don’t think you can get
any truth out of the system. That’s what you think in the beginning…after a
while, you know what to expect and you know that kind of thing is not
gonna—you can reason that that kind of thing and that error in there is not
gonna effect the whole system like that. (2012-05-30-i-G-G16/96)
At the heart of these notions of insight and understanding is the notion used by
modelers we identified above of having a ‘‘feel for the model.’’ We analyze it as a
kind of understanding of the dynamical behavior of a model which enables the
modeler to locate errors and also infer what changes will occur when adding specific
new elements or removing variables. Given the nonlinearity and complexity of these
models it is no easy task to acquire this understanding. However, the notions of
having a ‘‘feel for the model’’ or ‘‘insight’’ admittedly sound vague and somewhat
esoteric—the kind of notions philosophers shy away from. However it can be given
a more concrete sense. In cognitive terms our data suggest that the ability for
modelers to generate inferences from these complex networks requires two
cognitive components: simulative mental models and cognitive distribution
(Nersessian 2002, 2008, 2009).
3.1 Simulative mental modeling
Although there are many notions of ‘mental model’ in the literature, Nersessian
(2008) has constructed a ‘‘mental modeling framework’’ that provides a cognitive
basis for such model-based inference science. Notably, there has been an important
line of theoretical and experimental research going back to the reissue of the 1943
 17 Page 16 of 28 M. MacLeod, N. J. Nersessian
123
book on explanation by Kenneth Craik (1967) which focuses on specific processes
of dynamical and mechanistic mental modeling. This research provides a cognitive
basis for understanding what modelers do in the cases of inference we have
mentioned above. Nersessian provides ‘‘minimalist’’ description of a simulative
mental model in the form of a hypothesis about reasoning as follows:
…in certain problem-solving tasks, people reason by constructing an internal
iconic model of the situations, events, and processes that in dynamic cases can
be manipulated through simulation. Such a mental model is an organized unit
of knowledge that embodies representations of spatiotemporal relations,
representations of situations, entities and processes, as well as representations
of other pertinent information, such as causal structure (2008, 128).
The descriptions and self-reports we collected from a range of modelers in both lab
G and lab C suggest that our modelers build mental models of their networks which
allow them to mentally simulate limited aspects of network dynamics in order to
identify errors, explore new hypotheses about structure or parameters, and identify
dominant variables. When they communicate with us about what is happening in
their system models and how they perform these various inferences, they do so
using such mental models. Experimental research in cognitive psychology and AI
research on dynamic mental modeling in lay ‘‘scientific’’ thinking is extensive and
we extract only the most relevant findings here. This research has identified specific
features associated with mental simulations of physical and mechanistic models
such as multiple pulley systems. These simulations are,
1. Qualitative (Roschelle and Greeno 1987; de Kleer and Brown 1981).
2. Piecemeal (Roschelle and Greeno 1987; Hegarty 1992, 2004; Schwartz and
Black 1996).
3. Supported by background knowledge in long-term memory (Roschelle and
Greeno 1987).
4. Coupled externally with visual and other representations (Hegarty 1992;
Hegarty and Steinhoff 1997).
As we can infer from their descriptions, the mental models our researchers construct
appear to manifest these properties. The mental models involved in the specific
inferences we have discussed above are typically not quantitative. These models
track and record only the qualitative behavior of variables. Our modelers orally
express their thought processes in the language of ‘‘increasing,’’ ‘‘decreasing,’’
‘‘inhibiting,’’ and so forth. Consider again this statement from G16,
I find glitches in the model… And when you look at it there’s no way it can
get better because it depends on two things, and those two other things, for
example, are increasing. So you can never get it decreasing for a period of
time from those two. Maybe something else has a role that I haven’t taking
into account.
Underlying G16’s inference is a mental representation of interactions in the
network, which she uses to make the counterfactual claim that under no
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circumstance could any manipulation of these variable produce the right behavior in
her target variable. She derives the claim by manipulating various variables
(mentally changing their values). Reasoning with these structures provides modelers
the ability to test mentally what the effect of modifications to the mathematical
model might be by mentally simulating them.
To do this however modelers work with mental models of only limited sets of
variables at any one time. G16 for instance describes only tracking a few elements
in the description she gives of her reasoning. This is consistent with the results of
Hegarty’s (1992) experiments on subjects solving pulley system problems. Hegarty
found that the attention of participants was confined mostly to directly connected
pulleys at any one time. Systems were worked through step by step. The self-reports
our modelers give of how they operate also suggests they do not reason with many
elements at any one point in time, but focus on directly interacting elements in a
network. However these elements do not need to be contiguous. Information derived
from the pathway and the mathematical equations governing the network can be
used to build up information on interactions among more remotely located elements,
which can then be used to simulate the effects of interactions between these
elements. The modeler builds expertise and knowledge of how to group the effects
of interactions (see Hegarty 1992).
The process of building up a feel for the model is iterative and intensive. It
requires, among other things, finding ways to familiarize oneself with how the
model works in order to interpret the qualitative effects of the various quantitative
mathematical relationships (Roschelle and Greeno 1987). This kind of process is
sometimes called envisioning (de Kleer and Brown 1981). G16 describes her
process of building an intuition of how an equation works:
So the thing is—when you want to solve a mathematical problems, you
gotta—sometimes you use numbers and try numbers, something to give you a
feel of—like intuitively how this, for example, equation works and all. So I’m
trying out numbers and then trying to make the steps kind of discrete—like
sort of a state machine, kind of thinking like we’re in this state. And then now
this much is going to this other metabolite pool and then at the same time we
have less of that. So I’m trying to see what the constraints are by actually like
doing a step-by-step sort of thing. (2012-08-31-i-G-G16/63)
In general, envisioning or building mental representations of model relationships
requires a background understanding of how to interpret mathematical equations,
but also, in the case of complex equations, requires processes that can visually
unpack model dynamics and allow them to be more readily interpreted. G16 showed
us an example of her process of visually tracking values in her model with pen and
paper representations as she was working on the problem. Model variables were
being solved numerically by her at different time steps, so she could track behaviors
in the model directly. This process was likely critical to her ability to build mental
models of relationships in the network she was studying, and in turn to draw various
inferences about the location of errors, potential modifications and dominant
relations.
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3.2 Coupled cognition and the role of computational simulation
The account outlined above suggests an important role for simulativementalmodeling
in model-building processes in ISB at the heart of many of the inferences model
builders need to make to improve their models. It also suggests an important role for
external representations, aswe saw throughG16’s use of certain visual representations
to build her own mental models. At the same time modelers like G16 rely on pathway
diagrams (see Fig. 3a, b) during their reasoning processes to provide a visual reference
or scaffold formanipulatingmodel internallywithout having to represent or keep track
of all structure purelymentally.8 As suchNersessian (2002, 2008, 2009) has argued, in
accord with the cognitive science research, that mental modeling of dynamical
processes is often coupled with pen and paper drawings (diagrams, sketches, graphs)
andwith physical simulationmodels bymeans ofwhich scientists reason about in vivo
phenomena (Nersessian and Patton 2009; Nersessian 2009). Chandrasekharan and
Nersessian (2015) have argued the case for coupling with computational represen-
tations. Together, drawing inferences by means of these coupled systems of mental
and artefactual models comprise what Nersessian (2002, 2008) calls ‘‘simulative
model-based reasoning.’’ The notion of coupling extends the framework of distributed
cognition (Hutchins 1995) which investigates the ways in which external represen-
tations used in problem-solving processes perform cognitive functions, thus creating a
distributed cognitive system comprising humans and artifacts. The focus of distributed
cognition has been on the use of existing artifacts, and our research group has been
extending the focus to the building of representational artifacts, such as physical and
computational simulations models (see, e.g., Chandrasekharan and Nersessian 2015;
MacLeod and Nersessian 2013a; Nersessian 2009, 2012; Osbeck and Nersessian
2006).
In most cases of modeling there is a limit to what can be done with visual pen and
paper representations. Computational representations are the central resource for
handling complex systems that exceed mental modeling capabilities. Computational
modeling is closely coupled with simulative mental modeling in model-building
practice. Together they form a coupled cognitive system relying on both
components to perform essential calculations and generate inferences neither alone
could. For instance, the computational model provides the modeler:
1. Visual representations of complex model dynamics that can be translated into
qualitative relationships;
2. Piecemeal and selective visual representations that can be represented mentally
within cognitive capacities;
3. The ability to check or calibrate the results of mental simulation and correct
their mental models; and
4. The ability to test their mental inferences about network structure and behavior.
8 See also Jones and Wolkenhauer (2012) for a discussion of how pathway diagrams serve as locality
aids. These diagrams provide an information rich representation in comparison with sentential
representations, which by visual representing relationships, minimizes the amount of search time
required to extract relevant information a modeler might need.
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The value of computational modeling and simulation for this coupled cognitive
systems stems from the ability of computers to perform complex calculations that
are cognitively intractable for the human agent and from the ease with which
computational representations of complex system can be visualized in the way
modelers require (for instance, providing visual graphs to track just specific
relations). Further the simulative capacity of the computational model provides the
ability to implement manipulations quickly and efficiently so that modelers can run
through plausible options or hypotheses in quick succession. In these ways
information is exchanged back and forth between both components of a hybrid
computer–human cognitive system, and the overall cognitive benefit is to extend
human cognitive capacities so that accurate inferences about how to improve
complex models of complex systems become possible. Diverse network behaviors
in response to parameter variations or at different time points, as a result of
nonlinearity, can be identified through computational simulation and partitioned
into families of mental models representing network relations under different
conditions or at different times. This is consistent with the piecemeal notion of
mental simulation discussed above. So for instance situations in which feedback
produces oscillations can be bracketed from those in which it produces more linear
behavior and treated somewhat separately. If two variables of interest are placed far
apart in the network simulation their relations to one another can still be detected
leaving out any complex intermediate interactions. The gradual development of the
coupling enables the modeler to develop detailed understanding of the pathway’s
dynamical behavior contained within families of mental models through running
thousands of computational simulations, using many parameter combinations, and
analyzing system dynamics for each simulation.
4 Cognitive constraints and methodological choice
Simulative mental modeling and distributed cognition, together, can provide a
cognitive account of how model builders generate the inferences they need to
construct models of complex biochemical systems. They account for how modelers
are often able to produce quite substantial discoveries, with only the barest
biological knowledge, during the process. In general modelers are able through
these techniques of producing models that capture at least some of the dynamics of a
system well. But the models produced are usually far from complete, and often fall
short of the goals individual models have, not to mention the field at large. As
mentioned earlier, part of fundamental rhetoric of systems biology is that control is
distributed over large scales, so large-scale models are required in order to capture
the control structure of actual systems. Molecular biology, with its focus on local
interactions, can never develop that kind of insight. Mathematics and computation
are essential to deriving these relationships from complex systems. However
systems biologists using the kind of bottom-up strategies our labs use do not work
with systems of the desired size (number of elements of a network included) and
scale (the inclusiveness by which boundaries of the network are drawn), but with
smaller sub-systems or simplified systems. In fact the kind of models produced do
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not enable researchers to meet another other goal of systems biology either, which is
to extract the design and organizing principles underlying biological networks. As
Voit et al. put it, ‘‘If one would survey all computational systems models in biology,
published during the past decade, one would find that the vast majority are neither
small enough to permit elegant mathematical analyses of organizing principles nor
large enough to approach the reality of cell or disease processes with high fidelity’’
(2012a, b, 23).
Systems biologist have proved mostly incapable at present of handling systems of
large enough scale to get models that are predictively valid and reliable enough in
particular for medical decision making (see Voit et al. 2012a, b). On epistemo-
logical grounds the models built fall short of what they are built for, and indeed a
philosophical analysis that only analysed the epistemological structure of these
models would find them unjustified. We believe that the kind of cognitive account
we are giving of model-building processes also helps explain partially at least why
modellers choose to construct models of insufficient size and scale given the goals
they often set out with (Sect. 4.1). Further a cognitive approach can also help
explain and rationalize the size and scale at which representations are being
constructed within the field as a case of ‘‘mesoscopic modeling’’ (Sect. 4.2).
4.1 Constraints on simulative mental modeling and their implications
for modeling
Although computational modeling can extend the ability of modelers to deal with
more complex systems, the human agent is notably a component in the model-
building processes. The human component has not received much attention in
discussions of distributed cognition to date. But it is the human component which
often provides the rate-limiting step on the level of complexity that can be addressed
through these practices. It is well known that people in general are not good at
building and using causal mental models—even less so with nonlinear systems
(Doyle et al. 2007). In the case of simulative mental modeling one can identify a
clear constraint in the form of working memory (Hegarty 1992). Humans can only
keep a limited set of interactions in their minds at any one time. Visual
representations and computations help extend this, but ultimately it is the human
agent that has to draw an inference by processing the information before him or her.
If this information involves too large a set of factors or these elements are
interacting in too complex a way to be qualitatively processed into descriptive units
of information such as ‘‘increasing’’, then the task will be too difficult.
This factor puts implicit limits on the complexity of the networks with which
modelers can deal. Particular complex features of networks introduce many factors
that need to be processed simultaneously in order to make inferences. These often
involve quantitative sensitivity that is much harder to decompose into small packets
of qualitative information even with the aid of computation. These factors include
for instance, feedback relations, competitive reactions and multiple network
functions of elements, many interactions at any node, and long chains between
relevant variables which will include more of these types of interactions to process.
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The more of these interactions, the harder mentally simulating a set of network
components in order to improve a computational model is likely to be. Some of
these kinds of issues can be dealt with by simplification processes, but as stressed
many of those kinds of simplification processes (e.g., inferring sensitivity) depend
themselves on judgments and arguments constructed through mental modeling.
Broadly speaking it is plausible to expect then that human cognitive constraints set
limits on the complexity of models that can be reliably constructed and thus on the
complexity of the systems that can be represented. Of course there is no way to
articulate precisely how to pick systems that meet these constraints. One way to
control complexity is to manage network size and scale and keep network
representations relatively small through careful selection of what networks to model
and which of those to include in a model at the outset. Smaller, more limited
pathways reduce the demands on working memory for debugging and model-based
inference.
Modelers themselves correlate scale with complexity and see it as setting limits
on their ability to get the necessary insight into how their models work. For instance
G70, an experimental collaborator with the lab G director (G4), reported this
reaction from G4 after handing him a large network to model.
But I think he’s (G4) been in the real world long enough doing this systems
stuff long enough that he knows to start small… so when I first came to him, I
had the proteomics systems. We’ve seen about 10% changes in about all the
changes in all the systems of the CF cell versus a non-CF cell. Now when you
think about the number of systems that are in cells, 10% changes in all of those
systems… is a considerable amount, I mean that is a lot of information. So
when I first went to… he’s like you are diluting yourself. So then we decided
to start with glycolysis and the pentosphosphate pathway of the Krebs cycle…
to narrow it down to energetic pathways that are very well modeled.
Instead of trying to build a model of such a large, intractable network, G4 directed
G70 towards the most cognitively reasonable strategy: using small models that were
already established and building outwards with those. In general modelers choose
not to work with entire sets of functional interactions that govern a phenomenon but
only with, hopefully, significant subsets. They choose not to incorporate all
interacting elements. In many cases they just do not know what all the relevant
interactions are, as we have seen. Further they choose to model interactions in less
accurate but more mathematically tractable ways. With an approximately accurate
result they have leverage for improving their model in a more piecemeal but
tractable fashion by increasing network complexity. This kind of strategy has been
called a ‘‘middle-out strategy’’ (Noble 2008). It forms an essential component of the
cognitive strategy of ‘‘mesoscopic modeling.’’
4.2 Mesoscopic modeling: a cognitive strategy
Cognitive constraints are not the only constraints modelers face. They also have to
deal with computational and data constraints, which all play a role in the decisions
modelers make. But if our description of the cognitive processes underlying model
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building is on target, it is reasonable to think that cognitive constraints set plausible
limits on the network size and scale modelers can handle. That said, an awareness of
these cognitive constraints and cognitive capacities also provide a basis upon which
to rationalize preferences for building smaller scale more abstract representations.
Some systems biologists argue in explicitly cognitive (rather than epistemological)
terms that the strategy of building smaller representations enables modelers to work
within cognitive constraints towards the eventual construction of the larger models
they need.9 They label this practice ‘‘mesoscopic modeling’’ (Voit et al. 2012a, b).
Voit et al. cite in particular developing and maintaining an understanding of the
system as the critical motivation for restricting models to mid-size models. These
models provide a, ‘‘coarse structure that allows us to investigate high-level
functioning of the system at one hand—and to test to what degree we understand, at
least in broad strokes, how key components of a biological system interact to
generate responses’’ (Voit et al. 2012a, b, 23). This basic understanding provides
insight into how to recognize deficiencies in the model and expand upon them to
give more complex and accurate representations. The basic motivation then for
treating mesoscopic modeling as a sensible and reasonable practice for modelers to
pursue at the outset is cognitive tractability, so as to keep the modeling process
within the ability of modelers to comprehend the model and recognize efficient
strategies for its improvement. With this comprehension the model can be scaled up
in a middle-out fashion.
Voit et al. argue that the process of building out models rely on basic human
learning processes.
This strategy of locally increasing granularity has its (ultimately unknown)
roots in semantic networks of learning and the way humans acquire complex
knowledge. As a trivial example, consider how we learn about fancy cars.
Although infants typically start their learning process with examples, rather
than abstract categories, they soon begin to distinguish static items form things
that move, eventually learn to differentiate between living and engineered
things that move, and become able to distinguish cars from trucks. Later, we
begin to distinguish between cheap and expensive cars, and in some cases we
learn to tell the year a car was made even if the differences between models
from one year to the next are subtle. This hierarchical learning is very
effective, because we are able to start simple and add information as we are
capable of grasping it. (p 23)
Although Voit and his collaborators focus principally on the value of mesoscopic
models for scaling up, rather than for their capacity to be built in the first place,
implicit in the kind of understanding or ‘‘grasping’’ they have in mind is the
9 Some systems biologists and philosophers have proposed ontological justifications of mesoscopic
modeling. Bertolaso (2011), Bertolaso et al. (2014), and Giuliani et al. (2014) argue that it is at
mesoscopic levels, or scales of network organization, at which functionality emerges in response to
higher-level system and environmental constraints. This may well be the case in certain cases. Our
researchers do not interpret their results as having this kind of significance in general however. Instead
they interpret what they have produced as partially explanatory and of limited application, but
nonetheless valid starting points for building more complex representations.
Modeling complexity Page 23 of 28  17 
123
importance of building a ‘‘feel for the model.’’ Models need to be of an
interpretable scale and complexity such that the modeler is capable of making good
decisions about how to modify them. As we have suggested above the capacities
and constraints of simulative mental modeling are the root of this understanding.
The strategy of mesoscopic modeling is thus guided by the intuition that cognitive
tractability is essential to the model-building process, and thus model scale and
complexity matter. Thus, this argument advocating that modelers should build
models of limited scale and complexity picks out a cognitive rationale as the
primary basis for this choice.
That said, cognition is not the only consideration relevant for this modeling
strategy. Mesoscopic modeling has to be sufficiently reliable epistemically.
Arguably however the choice of mesoscopic modeling cannot be rationalized
easily on epistemological grounds alone. Resulting representations are highly
abstract and simplified representations of systems that likely have a loose
relationship with underlying system mechanisms (MacLeod and Nersessian
2014). They might represent well particular relationships but much fitting has
usually been employed to get those results. The robustness of the resulting models
can be difficult to assess. These models do not capture accurately the control
structures of biological networks. The likely epistemological requirement at work
here is that these models get close enough to what is actually happening in a system
such that the smaller scale modifications such as de-black boxing variables into
subsystem components will likely improve model performance and accuracy. For
this what is required is only a ‘‘coarse validation’’ that demonstrates the model
replicates general patterns or trends of functioning in the system. Given the
simplifications and abstractions involved it is hard to interpret these models on their
own as good or reliable representations. Their potential epistemic value only makes
sense given the cognitive value of mesoscopic models and the ability to scale-up
such models. An adequate account of methodological choices made in this field
needs to go beyond epistemological analysis to at the underlying cognitive
motivations.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to outline a feasible cognitive account for explaining
problem-solving processes and methodological choices in a computational field like
systems biology. We have tried to show some dimensions by which cognition is
implicated centrally in processes of model-building, particular inferential processes
and, in turn, how these processes are likely limited or constrained. These constraints
might well set limits on the degree of complexity models can have in order to be
solved using model-based inferential processes. Although many constraints are part
of the modeling process, at least some systems biologists see cognitive constraints
as the principal reason for limiting model-scales to mid-size mesoscopic models.
Methodological choices in the field are thus to an extent at least driven by cognitive
limitations and cognitive capacities.
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While we do not offer here exhaustive evidence for our account, we do think
what we provide motivates the importance of cognitive science for helping to
answer traditional philosophical questions about methodological choice and rational
principles underlying it, particularly with respect to the current philosophical goal
of constructing an epistemology of simulation. Indeed as science with the aid of
computation moves to tackle in detail complex phenomena, it can be predicted that
cognitive limitations are likely to become increasingly substantial issues for
scientific researchers when making methodological decisions. The role of
computational simulation in modern science arguably makes human cognitive
capacities a much more salient issue, since it allows researchers to go much farther
into realms where complexity and cognitive limitations really bite. This is an
essential part of the novelty of computational simulation which philosophers need
to consider. As Humphreys puts it in the hybrid scenario where science is done at
least partially by machines, ‘‘one cannot completely abstract from human cognitive
abilities when dealing with representational and computational issues’’ (Humphreys
2009, 616; see also Nersessian and MacLeod 2017). Scientists themselves will need
to make explicit decisions about what kind epistemic goals are appropriate with
respect to model building and, in turn, what kind of cognitive access and control
they need to have of the model-building process in order to ensure its success.
There is, of course, always the potential for raw powers of computation to take over
and automate these processes. But for the foreseeable future, as in the instances
explored above, researchers pursuing a bottom-up modeling strategy will need to
rely on relatively cognitively rich model-building strategies, albeit with much of the
process distributed computationally. As such it is reasonable to expect cognitive
factors to play an increasingly prominent role in methodological choice and to
anticipate that methodological choice might often have robust rationally warranted
cognitive explanations rather than just pure epistemological or ontological ones.
Philosophical accounts of simulation methodology need to take cognition into
account.
Lastly maintaining a normative focus for philosophy of science in the context of
simulation requires much more attention to the practicalities of research (Winsberg
2009, 2010). And here cognitive constraints should bite as well. There seems little
point formulating normative proposals if they are not cognitively achievable.
Recognizing what is achievable will be aided, significantly, by a deeper
understanding of the cognitive processes involved in model-building such as the
kind we have considered here.
Acknowledgements We appreciate the support of the US National Science Foundation (N. Nersessian
PI; W. Newstetter co-Pi) in conducting this research (DRL097394084). Miles MacLeod’s participation
was also supported by a postdoctoral fellowship at the Academy of Finland Centre of Excellence in the
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, University of Helsinki. Members of the Centre contributed much
advice in earlier developments of this paper. We thank the directors of Lab C and Lab G for welcoming us
into the lab and the lab-members of those labs for granting us numerous interviews. We thank the
members of our research group for contributing valuable insights, especially Vrishali Subramanhian, Lisa
Osbeck, Sanjay Chandrasekharan, and Wendy Newstetter. We also thank the two anonymous reviewers
and the guest editors whose comments substantially improved the paper.
Modeling complexity Page 25 of 28  17 
123
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, dis-
tribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were
made.
References
Alon, U. (2006). An introduction to systems biology: Design principles of biological circuits. Boca Raton:
CRC Press.
Alon, U. (2007). Network motifs: Theory and experimental approaches. Nature Reviews Genetics, 8(6),
450–461.
Bertolaso, M. (2011). Hierarchies and causal relationships in interpretative models of the neoplastic
process. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences, 33(4), 515–535.
Bertolaso, M., Giuliani, A., & Filippi, S. (2014). The mesoscopic level and its epistemological relevance
in systems biology. In A. X. C. N. Valente, A. Sarkar, & Y. Gao (Eds.), Recent advances in systems
biological research (pp. 19–36). New York: Nova Science Publishers.
Chandrasekharan, S., & Nersessian, N. J. (2015). Building cognition: The construction of external
representations for discovery. Cognitive Science, 39, 1727–1763.
Chandrasekharan, S., & Nersessian, N. J. Beyond correspondence: How the process of constructing
models leads to discoveries and transfer in bioengineering sciences. Studies in the History and
Philosophy of the Biomedical and Biological Sciences (forthcoming).
Chandrasekharan, S., Nersessian, N. J., & Subramaninan, V. (2012). Computational modeling: Is this the
end of thought experiments in science. In J. Brown, M. Frappier, & L. Meynell (Eds.), Thought
experiments in philosophy, science and the arts (pp. 239–260). London: Routledge.
Craik, K. J. W. (1967). The nature of explanation. Cambridge: CUP Archive.
Darden, L. (1991). Theory change in science: Strategies from Mendelian genetics. NY: Oxford
University.
de Kleer, J., & Brown, J. S. (1981). Mental models of physical mechanisms and their acquisition. In J.
R. Anderson (Ed.), Cognitive skills and their acquisition (pp. 285–309). New Jersey: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates.
Doyle, J. K., Radzicki, M. J., & Trees, W. S. (2007). Measuring change in mental models of complex
dynamic systems. In H. Qudrat-Ullah, P. Davidsen & J. M. Spector (Eds.), Complex decision making
(pp. 269–294). Berlin: Springer.
Giere, R. N. (1988). Explaining science: A cognitive approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Giere, R. N. (2002). Scientific cognition as distributed cognition. In P. Carruthers, S. Stich, & M. Siegal
(Eds.), The cognitive basis of science (pp. 285–299). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Giuliani, A., Filippi, S., & Bertolaso, M. (2014). Why network approach can promote a new way of
thinking in biology. Frontiers in Genetics. https://doi.org/10.3389/fgene.2014.00083.
Hegarty, M. (1992). Mental animation: Inferring motion from static displays of mechanical systems.
Journal of Experimental Psychology. Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 18(5), 1084.
Hegarty, M. (2004). Mechanical reasoning by mental simulation. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 8(6),
280–285.
Hegarty, M., & Steinhoff, K. (1997). Individual differences in use of diagrams as external memory in
mechanical reasoning. Learning and Individual Differences, 9(1), 19–42.
Hetherington, J. P., Warner, A., & Seymour, R. M. (2006). Simplification and its consequences in
biological modelling: Conclusions from a study of calcium oscillations in hepatocytes. Journal of
the Royal Society, Interface, 3(7), 319–331.
Hood, L., Heath, J. R., Phelps, M. E., & Lin, B. (2004). Systems biology and new technologies enable
predictive and preventative medicine. Science, 306(5696), 640–643.
Humphreys, P. (2004). Extending ourselves: Computational science, empiricism, and scientific method.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Humphreys, P. (2009). The philosophical novelty of computer simulation methods. Synthese, 169,
615–626.
 17 Page 26 of 28 M. MacLeod, N. J. Nersessian
123
Hutchins, E. (1995). Cognition in the wild. MIT Press.
Jones, N., & Wolkenhauer, O. (2012). Diagrams as locality aids for explanation and model construction in
cell biology. Biology and Philosophy, 27(5), 705–721.
Kitano, H. (2002). Looking beyond the details: A Rise in system-oriented approaches in genetics and
molecular biology. Current Genetics, 41(1), 1–10.
Lenhard, J. (2006). Surprised by a nanowire: Simulation, control, and understanding. Philosophy of
Science, 73, 605–616.
Lenhard, J. (2007). Computer simulation: The cooperation between experimenting and modeling.
Philosophy of Science, 74, 176–194.
Levins, R. (1966). The strategy of model building in population biology. American Scientist, 54(4),
421–431.
MacLeod, M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2013a). Building simulations from the ground-up: Modeling and
theory in systems biology. Philosophy of Science, 80, 1–24.
MacLeod, M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2013b). Coupling Simulation and experiment: The bimodal strategy in
integrative systems biology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical
Sciences, 44, 572–584.
MacLeod, M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2013c). The creative industry of systems biology.Mind & Society, 12,
35–48.
MacLeod, M., & Nersessian, N. J. (2014). Strategies for coordinating experimentation and modeling in
integrative systems biology. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and Develop-
mental Evolution, 9999, 1–10.
Nersessian, N. J. (1984). Faraday to Einstein: Constructing meaning in scientific theories. Dordrecht:
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Nersessian, N. J. (1992). How do scientists think? Capturing the dynamics of conceptual change in
science. In R. Giere (Ed.), Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science (pp. 3–45). Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Nersessian, N. J. (2002). The cognitive basis of model-based reasoning in science. In P. Carruthers, S.
Stich, & M. Siegal (Eds.), The cognitive basis of science (pp. 133–153). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Nersessian, N. J. (2008). Creating scientific concepts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Nersessian, N. J. (2009). How do engineering scientists think? Model-based simulation in biomedical
engineering research laboratories. Topics in Cognitive Science, 1, 730–757.
Nersessian, N. J., & MacLeod, M. (2017). Models and simulations. In L. Mangani & T. Bertolotti (Eds.),
The Springer handbook of model-based science. Berlin: Springer.
Nersessian, N. J., & Patton, C. (2009). Model-based reasoning in interdisciplinary engineering: Two case
studies from biomedical engineering research laboratories. In A. Meijers (Ed.), Philosophy of
technology and engineering sciences (pp. 678–718). Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers.
Noble, D. (2008). The music of life: Biology beyond genes. New York: Oxford University Press.
Osbeck, L., & Nersessian, N. J. (2006). The distribution of representation. The Journal for the Theory of
Social Behaviour, 36, 141–160.
Parker, W. S. (2010). Predicting weather and climate: Uncertainty, ensembles and probability. Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics,
41(3), 263–272.
Roschelle, J. R., & Greeno, J. G. (1987). Mental models in expert physics reasoning (pp. 285–736).
Washington, DC: ERIC Document ED, Office of Naval Research.
Schwartz, D. L., & Black, J. B. (1996). Shuttling between depictive models and abstract rules: Induction
and fallback. Cognitive Science, 20(4), 457–497.
Thagard, P. (1988). Computational philosophy of science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Voit, E. O. (2000). Computational analysis of biochemical systems: A practical guide for biochemists and
molecular biologists. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Voit, E. O. (2013a). A first course in systems biology. New York: Garland Science.
Voit, E. O. (2013b). Boichemical systems theory: A review. ISRN Bioinformatics, 2913, 1–53.
Voit, E. O., Newstetter, W. C., & Kemp, M. L. (2012a). A feel for systems. Molecular Systems Biology,
8(1), 609.
Voit, E. O., Qi, Z., & Kikuchi, S. (2012b). Mesoscopic models of neurotransmission as intermediates
between disease simulators and tools for discovering design principles. Pharmacopsychiatry, 45(1),
22.
Weisberg, M. (2006). Robustness analysis. Philosophy of Science, 73(5), 730–742.
Modeling complexity Page 27 of 28  17 
123
Westerhoff, H. V., & Kell, D. B. (2007). The methodologies of systems biology. In F. Boogerd, F.
J. Bruggeman, J.-H. S. Hofmeyer, & H. V. Westerhoff (Eds.), Systems biology: Philosophical
foundations (pp. 23–70). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Wimsatt, W. C. (2007). Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings: Piecewise approximations to
reality. Harvard University Press.
Winsberg, E. (2009). Computer simulation and the philosophy of science. Philosophy Compass, 4(5),
835–845.
Winsberg, E. (2010). Science in the age of computer simulation. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
 17 Page 28 of 28 M. MacLeod, N. J. Nersessian
123
